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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether the New Union Department of Natural Re-
sources may exercise CERCLA natural resource trustee-
ship over the area affected by the hazardous substance
on land owned by Tippecanoe Logging Company.
II. Whether Tippecanoe Logging Company may escape lia-
bility pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) under any of the
defenses listed.
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OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS BELOW
The opinion of the District Court of New Union is unpub-
lished and appears in the record on appeal, reproduced in Ap-
pendix A.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is waived pursuant to Rule 4(c) of the official
rules for the 1994 Sixth Annual National Environmental Law
Moot Court Competition.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The constitutional provisions and statutes relevant to
the determination of the present case are listed in the Table
of Authorities, contained at Appendix B.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States
District Court for the District of New Union, rendered April
23, 1993. Tippecanoe Logging Company ("TLC") and Tyler-2
Mining ("T2M") appeal from the District Court decision al-
lowing the New Union Department of Natural Resources
("DNR") to exercise natural resource trusteeship over TLC's
land pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(f). T2M and the State of New Union ("New
Union") appeal from the District Court decision allowing TLC
to raise defenses under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). Further, New
Union has standing before this Court because the damage
caused by the toxic spill violated its interest in preserving its
natural resources. As substantive issues of law have been
raised, this Court should review this appeal de novo.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The fifty pairs of blue robins ("robin") which remain in
the world and the purple daisy ("daisy") have been declared
endangered under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), 16
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/9
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U.S.C. § 1533. (R.2). 1 On April 27, 1992, a toxic spill in New
Union's Harrison Forest destroyed ninety percent of the dai-
sies and severely damaged the robin's critical habitat. (R.3).
Within five to eight years, the trees and shrubs in the robin's
habitat will be destroyed. (R.3). The robin has no known al-
ternate habitats. (R.3). TLC, a large forest products com-
pany, owns eighteen square miles of Harrison Forest which is
the only known habitat of both the robin and the daisy. (R.1-
2). TLC and T2M, as owners of the parcels of land, are
strictly liable under CERCLA for these damages because haz-
ardous waste is located on their property. (R.4-5).
The green swallow ("swallow") also was injured by the
spill. (R.2). The swallow, which is currently under United
States Department of the Interior ("DOI") consideration for
classification as an endangered species, has a symbiotic rela-
tionship with the daisy. (R.1). The swallow lays its eggs in
the daisies' leaves and the egg shells add a critical nutrient to
the daisies' soil. (R.1). The swallow's only known reproduc-
tive habitat is the daisy. (R.1).
The swallow is also economically significant to New
Union. The swallows migrate to Harrison Forest on a quad-
rennial cycle to reproduce. (R. 1). The movie "The Swallows of
Cappuccino" has made the species famous outside of New
Union. (R.1). Approximately thirty thousand tourists from
around the world come to New Union to witness the swallows'
unique flying formations. (R.1). These tourists provide signif-
icant revenue for New Union's economy. (R. 1). The swallows
are scheduled to return in 1995. (R.1).
Operating under the slogan "Give nature some TLC,"
TLC portrays itself as environmentally ethical. (R.1). How-
ever, when TLC discovered unionite ore in Harrison Forest, it
parcelled off Site 18, the area with the richest vein of ore, for
mining. (R.2). Site 18 was sold to Mine-Finders, Inc., a ven-
ture capital firm specializing in matching mining companies
with new mining sites. (R.2). Two months later, Mine-Find-
ers sold Site 18 to T2M. (R.2). Title to Site 18 was transferred
1. Cites to (R.-) refer to pages of the decision of the United States District
Court for the District of New Union.
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by deed in fee simple absolute, and included an easement, the
right of entry and exit on Access Road #5. (R.2). Access Road
#5 is the only means of ground access to Site 18, and is
owned, operated and maintained by TLC. (R.2).
Before it would grant T2M zoning approval to develop
the site, the Harrison County Board of Supervisors required
T2M to insert additional provisions in its deed of sale. (R.2).
T2M warranted that it would use an independent contractor
who was approved by the New Union Department of Environ-
mental Protection ("NUDEP") to operate and maintain the
site. (R.2). Additionally, T2M was required to arrange an an-
nual environmental audit and to correct promptly any defi-
ciencies noted in that audit. (R.3). T2M holds all requisite
permits under federally authorized programs administered
by NUDEP. (R.2).
The mining activity on Site 18 caused the toxic spill in
Harrison Forest on April 27, 1989. (R.2). The mining opera-
tions produced highly acidic leachate waste known to be espe-
cially toxic to plants. (R.2). This waste was stored in a
surface impoundment adjacent to both the robin and daisy
habitats. The impoundment was drained every forty-five
days. (R.2). An inspection conducted four days before the
spill revealed no deficiencies, yet on the day before the im-
poundment was to be drained a crack developed. (R.3).
Though on the previous day it rained more heavily than it
had in ten years, when the crack developed the impoundment
was filled with forty-four days of waste. (R.3). From that
crack, leachate waste poured from the impoundment,
blanketing an area nearly one and a half times the size of the
site. (Map, A-7).
NUDEP concluded that natural resource damages com-
pensation was necessary to replace and restore the endan-
gered species and their habitats the spill destroyed. (R.3).
New Union seeks damages to study alternate habitats for the
robin and to re-propagate the daisy in the New Union State
Wilderness Area in preparation for the swallows' anticipated
return in 1995. (R.4). New Union has designated the DNR as
the trustee in order to protect these natural resources pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f). (R.3).
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/9
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
New Union may assert trusteeship in order to protect the
endangered species on privately owned land because they
have substantial control over those resources. The DOI regu-
lations permit government trusteeship over natural re-
sources on privately-owned land when there is control or
trust over those resources.
The daisies, robins, and swallows are natural resources
which are controlled and held in trust by New Union. Natu-
ral resources include land, wildlife, and biota which are man-
aged, held in trust, or otherwise controlled by the United
States or any state government. These species are controlled
and held in trust by the federal and state governments pursu-
ant to the ESA, New Union's common law regarding wildlife,
the public trust doctrine, and the doctrine of parens patriae.
Natural resource trusteeship over TLC's land affected by
the hazardous waste is not a "taking" in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. New Union's plan to exert trusteeship does not
amount to a physical invasion of TLC's land. Acting as
trustee, New Union would not interfere with any property in-
terest or any reasonable development expectations that TLC
might have in its land. Furthermore, a partial takings analy-
sis does not apply because the area affected by the spill con-
stitutes only a small portion of TLC's property.
TLC may not avail itself of any of CERCLA's enumerated
defenses. The heaviest rainfall in ten years is not the kind of
unpredictable event that qualifies as an act of God. Further-
more, TLC cannot successfully raise the third-party defense
because it failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
any of the elements of that defense. TLC has not shown that
a third party was the sole cause of the release and subse-
quent harm. TLC owned and maintained Access Road #5,
and Site 18's deed of sale and its provisions created indirect
contractual relationships between TLC and T2M that were
related to the handling of the leachate. Furthermore, TLC
sold the land aware that it would eventually be mined, and
cognizant of the site's proximity to the endangered species.
1994] 799
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In light of this knowledge, TLC did not exercise due care or
take any precautions against the foreseeable spill.
TLC also may not avail itself of the innocent landowner
exception, because it did not acquire its land prior to the haz-
ardous release. The exception requires that at the time the
facility was "acquired," the defendant did not know and had
no reason to know that a hazardous substance had been dis-
posed there. This language contemplates only subsequent
ownership and not the continual ownership that TLC exer-
cised over the spill site.
Moreover, TLC should not be allowed to use the combina-
tion defense to escape liability because it has failed to estab-
lish all of the requisite elements of each affirmative defense.
An interpretation which allows the elements of one defense to
compensate for deficiencies in another would create absurd
results. Such an interpretation would also be inconsistent
with Congress' intent to make CERCLA's liability strict and
to force polluters to clean up their toxic spills.
Since the plain meaning of CERCLA precludes the use of
defenses other than those enumerated in the statute, equita-
ble defenses are not recognized. In addition, the state is im-
mune from equitable doctrines when it asserts public rights.
Therefore, TLC may not assert any equitable defenses.
ARGUMENT
I. NEW UNION CORRECTLY ASSERTS NATURAL
RESOURCE TRUSTEESHIP BECAUSE IT
CONTROLS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES AND
HOLDS THEM IN TRUST FOR THE PUBLIC.
New Union's substantial interest in preserving its natu-
ral resources enables it to exercise trusteeship over the con-
taminated area in order to protect the daisy, robin and
swallow. These resources are appropriate subjects of natural
resource trusteeship because New Union exercises control
over them and holds them in trust for the public pursuant to
both the ESA and its state police powers. Natural Resource
Damage Assessments, 56 Fed. Reg. 19,752 (1991) (to be codi-
fied at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11 (proposed Apr. 29, 1991); see State of
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/9
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Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 459, 461
(D.C. Cir. 1989). Nor does New Union's assertion of trustee-
ship constitute a taking of private property as it is not deny-
ing TLC all economic value in its land. Accordingly, New
Union has offered an adequate basis for trusteeship, and the
decision of the District Court of New Union should be
affirmed.
A. New Union may assert trusteeship over TLC's land
because it has substantial control over the
resources located there.
CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions apply to
resources on privately-owned property when sufficient gov-
ernment control exists over the resources. Ohio, 880 F.2d at
459. Because New Union controls the daisy, robin and swal-
low pursuant to a grant of authority under the ESA, natural
resource trusteeship over TLC's land is proper.
The daisy and the robin are endangered species and
should be afforded the highest priority as their value is "in-
calculable." See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
174, 187 (1978). Congress has determined that "any endan-
gered species anywhere is of the utmost importance to man-
kind," Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources,
471 F. Supp 985, 995 (D. Haw. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th
Cir. 1981) (emphasis added), and thus, encourages control of
endangered species and their critical habitats, even when
found on private land. S. REP. NO. 307, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
7 (1973). When Congress enacted the ESA in 1973, it set up a
comprehensive regulatory scheme designed to preserve en-
dangered species and conserve their ecosystems. See Tennes-
see Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 153.
Pursuant to the regulatory powers under the ESA, the
Secretary of the Interior is authorized to exercise substantial
control over the regulation of the conservation of endangered
species. Id. The Secretary of the Interior, however, "shall co-
operate to the maximum extent practicable with the States
•.. for the purpose of conserving any endangered species...."
16 U.S.C. § 1535(a). Under the ESA, New Union is author-
ized to administer an endangered species conservation pro-
1994]
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gram, and in fact authorizes them to administer a program
that is more stringent than a federal conservation program.
16 U.S.C. § 1535(f). Through this grant of power, New Union
controls the daisy, robin and swallow and has thus estab-
lished an adequate basis for asserting natural resource trus-
teeship for their protection.
The daisies are subject to the ESA because they were de-
stroyed in violation of New Union's criminal trespass law.
The ESA explicitly prohibits the destruction of endangered
plants on any land when the destruction violates a state law
or regulation. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B). The destruction of
natural resources on private property constitutes a trespass.
See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303,
318 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 855 F.2d 1188
(6th Cir. 1988) (trespass resulted when chemicals were
moved from waste disposal site, through underground aqui-
fer, into plaintiff's water wells). The ESA's prohibition spe-
cifically includes violations of state criminal trespass laws.
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B); S. REP. NO. 240, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987). Similarly, damage to resources held in trust by
the government has been deemed a trespass. See, e.g., Satsky
v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 505, 511
(D. Colo. 1991) (State could bring trespass claim in its parens
patriae capacity); see also In re Acushnet River & New Bed-
ford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 994, 1000 (D. Mass. 1989) (State
may sue in trespass for injury to property it holds in trust).
The daisy is a proper subject for ESA protection, and thus, for
natural resource trusteeship, because the destruction of
ninety percent of all existing daisies constituted a violation of
New Union's criminal trespass law.
The robin is also protected under the ESA because its
critical habitat was "taken" as a result of the toxic spill. The
ESA defines "take" as including, but not limited to, harming,
harassing or killing any member of an endangered species.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). "Harm" and "harass" have been
broadly interpreted to include significant habitat degradation
which is likely to injure a species by impairing the normal
breeding, feeding or sheltering patterns of that species.
Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 852
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F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1988) (Palila II). In Palila, an en-
dangered bird received both its food and shelter from the ma-
ture Mamane tree. The court held that animals grazing on
Mamane seedlings constituted a "harm" because the seed-
lings could not mature and thus resulted in a future loss of
the endangered bird's food and shelter. Id. at 1108-9. The
harming of an endangered species does not require death or
even direct physical injury, but includes injury to habitat
which threatens the future extinction of a species. Id.; see
also Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260, 1272 (E.D. Tex.
1988), aff'd, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991) (the reduction of a
species' gene pool resulting in future genetic abnormalities
was held to constitute a taking).
Further, the ESA's legislative history supports the view
that the harm need not be imminent or certain. By including
"harassment" as a means of taking, Congress has indicated
that any activities which disturb the breeding, feeding or
sheltering patterns of a species, even in the future, will con-
stitute a taking. H.R. REP. NO. 412, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
As a result of the spill, both the robin and its critical
habitat have been presently and prospectively harmed. The
trees and shrubs which absorbed the leachate provide the
only known shelter for the robin, and are therefore critical to
its existence. It is likely that the robin will be injured
through its contact with the contaminated trees and shrubs.
Further, the critical habitat was degraded as soon as the
trees and shrubs which shelter the robin absorbed the
leachate into their roots. (R.3). Not only have the breeding,
feeding and sheltering patterns of the robin been disturbed,
but it is undisputed that in five to eight years the trees and
shrubs in the robin's habitat will be dead. (R.3). The impact
of the spill on the robin is analogous to that sustained by the
bird in Palila. When the trees and shrubs die, the robin may
become extinct. Thus, the leachate has had a definite impact
on both the robin and its critical habitat. Any determination
that harm five to eight years in the future is not imminent is
"shortsighted" and plays "Russian roulette" with the robin's
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existence. See Palila 11, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1075, 1082 (D.
Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
Moreover, the definition of "critical habitat" gives the
ESA the authority to protect the swallow because of its
symbiotic relationship to the daisy. Realizing that the degra-
dation of natural habitats posed the gravest threat to endan-
gered species, the ESA drafters broadly defined critical
habitat to include those areas which contain the physical or
biological features that are (i) essential to the conservation of
the species and (ii) which may require special management
considerations or protection. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A); Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt,
1 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Critical habitat has been further
defined to include the area in which a species lives and all
elements of that environment, including flora, fauna, and the
quality and chemical content of the soil, water and air. Na-
tional Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 368, n.9 (5th
Cir.), reh'g denied, 532 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
Boteler v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 429 U.S. 976 (1976).
The continued existence of the swallow is essential to re-
propagate the daisy. Every four years, the swallows lay their
eggs only in the daisies in Harrison Forest. (R.1). These eggs
provide essential nutrients to the soil where the daisy grows.
(R.1). The swallows will return to Harrison Forest in 1995,
but if the daisies are not re-propagated by then, the swallows
will be unable to lay their eggs. Further, the swallow, which
is already on a citizen petition for ESA protection, may be on
the precipice of extinction if it is unable to reproduce. If the
continued existence of the swallow is threatened, the contin-
ued existence of the endangered daisy is threatened in viola-
tion of the ESA. Just as in Palila, where eating the seedlings
prevented the trees from growing into the food of the endan-
gered bird, not re-propagating the daisy will decrease the
number of swallows, thereby reducing the supply of nutrients
which are essential to the daisy.
Once a species has been harmed or harassed, other provi-
sions of the ESA are triggered allowing the government to
exert substantial control over the species. For example, the
ESA's forfeiture provision states that any fish, wildlife or
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plant taken contrary to the Act shall be subject to forfeiture
to the United States. 16 U.S.C § 1540(e)(4)(A). Another pro-
vision commands land acquisition in order to protect endan-
gered species' natural habitats which are found on private
land. 16 U.S.C. § 1534. This provision gives the Secretary of
Interior broad authority and funding to acquire any real
property ("land, waters, or interests therein") which he finds
"necessary for the purpose of conserving, protecting, restor-
ing, or propagating any endangered or threatened species."
16 U.S.C. § 1534(a, b); S. REP. NO. 307, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
The current and prospective harm to the daisy, robin and
swallow in violation of the ESA allows New Union to exert
control over these resources. As soon as the spill killed the
daisy and modified the robin and swallow habitats, it consti-
tuted an ESA taking. Thus, the species were subject to forfei-
ture. Though neither New Union nor the Secretary of the
Interior have exercised the land acquisition provision, the
fact that they could provides additional proof of government
control over the daisy, robin and swallow. Therefore, the
ESA's authorization for substantial control provides the gov-
ernment with a sufficient basis for asserting trusteeship.
B. New Union is acting pursuant to its state police
power to protect natural resources which it holds
in trust.
The State of New Union seeks to protect the public's in-
terest in restoring and replacing the daisy, robin and swallow
pursuant to common law duties which CERCLA recognizes.
CERCLA provides that natural resource trustees may re-
cover damages for injury, destruction or loss of natural re-
sources which are held in trust by any state. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(B). A state's police power provides authority to
limit property rights as trustee for the public. See Hudson
County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
Under the police powers of the common law, states act as
trustees of wildlife within their borders and have the power
to preserve and regulate these important resources. See
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). Furthermore, states
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have the common law power to protect plants and wildlife
under the parens patriae and public trust doctrines. See Mat-
ter ofSteuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980). In
exerting trusteeship over the daisy, robin and swallow, New
Union acts pursuant to these common law police powers.
1. New Union may exert trusteeship over the
robin and swallow because it holds these
species in trust for the public pursuant to
the common law rule regarding wildlife.
New Union may exert trusteeship over the robin and
swallow on TLC's land because it has a legitimate interest in
conserving and protecting wild animals. See Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). New Union follows the com-
mon law rule regarding wildlife (R.4), and has the power to
protect wildlife living within, or migrating through, its bor-
ders pursuant to the common law rule. See State of Missouri
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (wild birds). This power
is manifested in the state's role as trustee over wildlife.
Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423, 1426
(10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987). As a
trustee over natural resources, New Union has a duty to pro-
tect the birds and has a sufficient interest to support an ac-
tion for damages to those resources. See Com. of Puerto Rico
v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d. 652, 671 (1st Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981) (recovery permitted for oil spill
damage to animals and the mangrove trees on which they de-
pend); State of Maryland Dep't. of Natural Resources v. Amer-
ada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp 1060, 1066 (1972).
The common law trust over New Union's wildlife is the
type contemplated by CERCLA's natural resource damages
provision. This common law trust gives New Union a greater
interest in the birds and more power to control them than
TLC. It is widely recognized that private parties do not own
wild birds. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434; see also
Douglas v. Seacoast Products Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977).
However, common law duties provide states with authority to
regulate these birds. While TLC has no interest in the robin
and swallow, New Union has an interest based on its common
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law duty to protect wildlife. Acting as New Union's designee,
the DNR would fulfill this duty by exerting trusteeship in or-
der to protect the robin and swallow.
2. New Union may assert trusteeship over the
daisy, robin and swallow because they are
encompassed by the common law parens
patriae doctrine.
The daisy, robin, and swallow are properly protected by
New Union as a trustee pursuant to its quasi-sovereign,
parens patriae capacity. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of
California, 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972) (parens patriae capacity
enables a state to prevent or repair harm to its quasi-sover-
eign interests). The common law parens patriae doctrine pro-
vides an additional authoritative basis for asserting
trusteeship if a state has an interest apart from those of par-
ticular private parties. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). To assert such capac-
ity, the state must allege that there has been an injury to a
substantial segment of its population. Id. at 607. This is de-
termined by evaluating all direct and indirect effects on the
residents. Id. While the Supreme Court has not enumerated
which quasi-sovereign interests effect a substantial segment
of the population, they have been interpreted to involve the
set of interests a state has in the health and well-being of its
populace. Id. at 601, 607. This set of interests includes abat-
ing public nuisances, conserving natural resources, and pro-
tecting its economy. See State of Idaho v. Southern
Refrigerated Transp., Inc., 1991 WL 22479, at *5 (D. Idaho
1991); see also Matter of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. at
39 (sovereign right to protect the public's interest in preserv-
ing wildlife resources). New Union's interest in abating pub-
lic nuisances as well as the economic interest in preserving
the endangered species provide it with a parens patriae justi-
fication to assert trusteeship.
The power to abate public nuisances is premised on a
state's interest, independent of and behind the titles of its cit-
izens, in all the earth and air within its domain. State of
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)
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(enjoining corporation from discharging noxious gases over
land, which caused wholesale destruction of forests, orchards
and crops). New Union has an interest in abating the public
nuisance resulting from the leachate spill. The leachate will
be absorbed by the soil and eventually may reach the ground-
water table. This could effect the drinking water of many
New Union residents. In addition, the spill has spread dan-
gerously close to the New Union State Wilderness Area.
When it rains there is a possibility that leachate runoff will
interfere with the public's enjoyment of the State Wilderness
Area.
Further, New Union has an interest in conserving and
protecting its natural resources. See Maine v. MI V Tamano,
357 F. Supp. 1097, 1110 (D. Me. 1973). Appreciating the im-
portance to a state's residents that their government have the
power to preserve and regulate important natural resources,
courts have allowed states to serve as trustees of natural re-
sources in a parenspatriae capacity. See Satsky, 778 F. Supp.
at 510; see also M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. at 1097.
New Union may base its authority for asserting trustee-
ship in the parens patriae doctrine because the interest in
conserving the endangered species is common to all of its citi-
zens. The current and future generations of New Union resi-
dents should be able to enjoy the aesthetic and educational
benefits of the daisy, robin and swallow. New Union's resi-
dents will be deprived of the opportunity to watch the swal-
lows' flying formations as depicted in the movie, "The
Swallows of Cappuccino." In addition, if New Union is pre-
vented from exerting trusteeship, there will be limited ability
to conduct scientific studies of the species. Re-propagation of
the daisies and relocation of the robin will facilitate such
studies.
Finally, the parens patriae doctrine has been extended to
include the protection of a wide variety of economic interests.
See, e.g., State of Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S.
439, 450 (1945) (parens patriae capacity was correctly as-
serted because trade barriers effect the economic prosperity
and welfare of a state); Com. of Pennsylvania v. West Vir-
ginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592, reh'g granted, 263 U.S. 671, aff'd,
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263 U.S. 350 (1923) (state was proper party to represent the
economic interest of its residents in maintaining access to
natural gas). New Union's interests include the economic po-
tential that could be realized in its tourism industry. If New
Union is not allowed to serve as natural resource trustee for
the endangered species, the daisy will not be re-propagated in
time for the 1994 growing season, and the swallows will be
unable to return to Harrison Forest. Accordingly, the future
revenue derived from the quadrennial visits of thousands of
tourists from around the world would be lost unless the daisy
and swallow are protected.
By asserting trusteeship over the endangered species,
the State of New Union is acting as the parens patriae,
trustee, guardian, and representative of all her citizens. The
State is entitled to seek relief because the matter complained
of effects her citizens at large. Thus, New Union's parens pa-
triae capacity is satisfied, and provides further authorization
for New Union's trusteeship for the protection of the daisy,
robin and swallow.
3. The public trust doctrine should be extended to
protect the daisy, robin and swallow because
they are critical in maintaining a healthy
environment.
New Union holds important natural resources in trust
for the benefit of its citizens under the public trust doctrine.
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469
(1988). Traditionally, the public trust doctrine has allowed
the state to protect citizens' rights to fish, to engage in com-
merce and to navigate upon waterways. Illinois Cent. R. Co.
v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), aff'd, 154 U.S. 225 (1894).
Each state retains the right to define the public trust doctrine
so that the interests of that state are best served. See Shively
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14, 24 (1894). Therefore, states have
flexibility in setting the boundaries of the doctrine so that it
can meet changing conditions and the needs of the public.
See Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J.
1972). Thus, several states have extended the doctrine to
protect wildlife and its habitats because of the importance to
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the public. See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Foundation, 799
F.2d at 1426; Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc., v. Pan-
handle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1095 (Idaho 1983).
New Union has developed its own version of the public trust
doctrine to meet its residents' needs. The New Union
Supreme Court held in 1979 that the public trust doctrine ap-
plied to Lake New Union's riverbeds and shores. (R.4). While
the court stated that privately owned land is not within the
public trust, it did not decide whether other natural resources
are subject to the public trust doctrine. (R.4).
This Court should further extend the public trust doc-
trine to protect the endangered species on TLC's land in order
to promote a healthy environment. Courts have applied the
public trust doctrine to private land in order to protect natu-
ral resources which are critical to a healthy environment.
See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768-770 (Wis.
1972) (doctrine applied to privately owned wetlands because
of their role in contributing to a healthy environment). The
daisy, robin and swallow, although found on private land,
play essential roles in maintaining a healthy environment.
Not only do these species interact with each other, but they
provide important links in surrounding ecosystems on both
public and private land. Because a healthy environment is a
public concern, the public trust doctrine should apply to natu-
ral resources that effect the environment even when they are
found on private land. Id.
Extending the public trust doctrine to endangered spe-
cies, irrespective of private or public ownership of the land,
would be consistent with CERCLA's rationale. First, CER-
CLA's natural resource damage provision establishes a public
trust remedy, which provides compensation to the public for
injury to natural resources. Natural Resource Damage As-
sessments, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,674 (1986) (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. pt. 11). Second, the public trust doctrine has been
deemed to be the legal basis for CERCLA's natural resource
damage provisions. See Kerry Russell, A Research Guide to
Natural Resource Damage Under the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 26
Land & Water L. Rev. 403 (1991). Third, CERCLA states
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that natural resources include those which are held in trust
by any state. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16). Expanding the public
trust doctrine to include important natural resources, regard-
less of where they are found, comports with the values behind
the doctrine and complements the steps other states have
taken to include wildlife in the doctrine's protection. There-
fore, because endangered species are important to the promo-
tion of a healthy environment, this Court should extend New
Union's public trust doctrine to include the daisy, robin and
swallow.
C. Trusteeship over TLC's land affected by the spill is
not a taking of private property in violation of
the Fifth Amendment.
Natural resource trusteeship over TLC's land affected by
the spill is not a taking of TLC's property for public use in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment
states in relevant part: "nor shall private property be taken
... without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V. It is
well established that a state may regulate private property
pursuant to its police power for the purpose of protecting the
health, safety and welfare of its citizens. Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928). Subsequently, a taking
occurs when there has been a physical invasion of private
land or when a regulation deprives an owner of all economic
value in its land. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992). In order to determine whether a
taking has occurred, the court must address the parcel of
land as a whole. Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-131 (1978). A partial takings analy-
sis is appropriate only when a substantial portion of the land
is subject to the regulation. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
New Union's plan to exert trusteeship does not effect a
physical invasion of TLC's land. Governmental monitoring
on private property is not a taking. Formanek v. United
States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 334 (1992). In Formanek, when gov-
ernment representatives walked on private property and took
plant samples, the court held that it was only a minor nui-
sance. Id. at 334. The court found that this was not a taking,
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despite the fact that a state botanist brought tours onto the
land and visited the property eleven times, two of which were
unauthorized visits. Id. at 333; but see Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
Similarly, New Union's entry onto TLC's land for the purpose
of studying the robin's habitat and re-propagating the daisy
does not constitute a taking. New Union will enter TLC's
land to study the robin's habitat requirements and to remove
samples or seeds of the remaining daisies. Under Formanek,
this would be considered only a minor nuisance, not a taking.
Moreover, trusteeship does not effect a taking of all the
value of TLC's property. In Lucas, the Court stated that a
law which denies all economic benefit of the land constitutes
a taking. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893. According to the Court,
the relevant consideration focuses on the economic impact of
the regulation and whether the regulation interferes with
reasonable investment-backed expectations. Id. In applying
this analysis, courts do not require that the property be avail-
able for its most beneficial use after the regulation is in place.
DeFeo v. Sill, 810 F. Supp. 648, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Where
there are many remaining economically viable uses for a
landowner's property, no taking has occurred. Deltona Corp.
v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1194 (Cl. Ct. 1981).
TLC has other economically viable options besides cut-
ting down the trees in the robin's habitat. For example, trus-
teeship over the affected area does not interfere with TLC's
ability to harvest trees from approximately seventy-percent
of its land. Not only can it gain economic benefits from the
unaffected area, but TLC may also harvest the trees from the
contaminated area other than those in the robin's habitat.
Therefore, the impact on TLC does not deprive it of all eco-
nomic benefit. Moreover, the land is available for mining,
and TLC can sell its property and mining rights. Trusteeship
will not interfere with these mining expectations because the
regulations prohibiting harm to habitats do not impact min-
ing operations which take place beneath the habitat. TLC's
reasonable investment-backed expectations for its land, as




Finally, a partial takings analysis does not apply in this
case because the area affected by the spill constitutes only a
small portion of TLC's property. Partial takings analysis is
generally employed only where a substantial segment of the
property is being regulated. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. In
Lucas, the court found that a regulation effecting ninety-per-
cent of the land qualified as a partial taking. Id. Similarly,
the lost use of 20 acres of an 80 acre parcel did not constitute
a taking. Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210, 1213 (Cl.
Ct. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); see also
Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991) (regulation of
fourteen acres of a forty acre parcel of land not a taking).
Here, the affected area appears to constitute less than thirty-
percent of TLC's land in Harrison Forest. (Map, A-7). Thirty-
percent is not a substantial portion of TLC's property under
the Lucas rationale. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. Simi-
larly, because the Jentgen and Ciampitti courts held that lost
use of one quarter of the land did not constitute a taking,
then thirty-percent should be inadequate as well.
This Court should reject the reasoning of the one court
which has applied a partial takings analysis when only a
small portion of the land was affected because the cases are
distinguishable. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,
21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990). Loveladies involved a 250 acre parcel of
property. The landowners were denied the right to develop
51 acres of wetlands on the property. Subsequently, they
were denied the right to develop a 12 acre plot within those
wetlands. The court looked only to the 12 acre plot when ana-
lyzing the takings issue. Id. The Loveladies court held that
there was a taking because (1) there was a lack of a substan-
tial legitimate state interest; (2) the property surrounding
the parcel was either developed or had been denied a permit;
and (3) there was substantial valuation of the 12 acre parcel.
Id. Here, New Union is exerting natural resource trusteeship
over the critical habitats of the daisy and robin. Accordingly,
the substantial state interest in protecting endangered spe-
cies makes this case factually distinguishable from Lovela-
dies. Furthermore, the property surrounding the
contaminated area has always been available for economic
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development by TLC. In fact, even the area within the spill
site that is not part of the critical habitat of the robin may be
developed. Finally, the record is silent as to valuation of
either the critical habitat or the spill site. Therefore, on the
facts of this case the Loveladies partial takings analysis is
inapplicable, and there has been no taking.
II. TLC CANNOT AVAIL ITSELF OF ANY CERCLA
DEFENSES BECAUSE IT HAS FAILED TO PROVE
THAT THE TOXIC SPILL WAS SOLELY CAUSED BY
AN ACT OF GOD, A THIRD PARTY OR A
COMBINATION OF THE TWO.
TLC cannot successfully assert any CERCLA defenses
without misinterpreting the language or purpose of the stat-
ute. A party may be relieved of liability only if it proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that it satisfies one of the
three affirmative defenses provided by the statute. See B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992).
The relevant statutory defenses require that the release of
the hazardous substance be caused solely by (1) an act of God;
(2) an act or omission of a third party; or (3) any combination
of the foregoing paragraphs. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1),(3),(4).
These defenses were drafted narrowly in order to increase the
scope of CERCLA's liability provisions. See United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1106 (1989). In light of this goal, heavy rainfall does
not qualify as an act of God within the meaning of the stat-
ute. In addition, TLC is not relieved of liability under the
third-party defense because it did not satisfy the requisite el-
ements of the defense. Finally, TLC cannot assert a combina-




A. TLC may not avail itself of the act of God defense
because the rainfall was not an exceptional
natural phenomenon and the effects of the spill
were foreseeable and preventable.
TLC may not avail itself of the act of God defense by mis-
characterizing the rainfall that occurred the day before the
spill. Under CERCLA, an act of God is defined as an unantic-
ipated grave natural disaster or other natural phenomenon of
an exceptional, or inevitable character, the effects of which
could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of
due care or foresight. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1). Heavy rain fall is
not the type of natural disaster or exceptional natural phe-
nomenon contemplated by CERCLA. See United States v.
Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1987). In
contrast, lightning has been identified as a natural phenome-
non that may qualify as an act of God under CERCLA. Wag-
ner Seed Co., Inc. v. Bush, 709 F. Supp. 249, 250 (D.D.C.
1989), aff'd, 946 F.2d 918 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1584
(1992). While pinpointing the location where lightning will
strike is virtually impossible, normal climatic conditions
make it possible to predict heavy rainfall, and therefore make
it foreseeable. See Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. at 1061 (heavy
rains not an act of God because they were predictable).
Moreover, the effects of rainfall are foreseeable, and thus
preventable. Accordingly, TLC could have requested that
T2M empty the nearly full impoundment or stop mining in
anticipation of the heavy rainstorm. Furthermore, because
the crack did not develop until the day after the rainfall, TLC
could have suggested that T2M empty the impoundment the
day of the storm, rather than wait until the end of the dispo-
sal cycle two days later. Because actions could have been
taken to prevent the effects of the storm, the rainfall is not an
act of God.
Further, even if the rainfall was unpredictable, the re-
sulting harm to the endangered species could have been pre-
vented. TLC could have designed its own rain contingency
plan, including emergency run-off drainage channels adja-
cent to the mining site. See Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. at
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1061 (act of God defense denied where drainage channels
could have prevented harm caused by rain). TLC could also
have requested that the impoundment be built further from
the endangered species. Therefore, because TLC took no pre-
cautionary measures, it cannot escape liability under CER-
CLA's act of God defense.
B. TLC cannot avail itself of the third-party defense
because it has failed to prove the requisite
elements of the defense.
TLC cannot successfully assert the third-party defense
because it failed to prove both requisite statutory elements.
The third-party defense requires a party to prove that (1)
there is no contractual relationship (direct or indirect) with a
third party; and (2) defendant exercised due care and took
precautions against a third party's foreseeable acts or omis-
sions and the results therefrom. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3); see
also Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 168-169. Because TLC failed
to prove these requirements it cannot assert the third-party
defense.
1. TLC and T2M maintain contractual
relationships through the deed of sale,
transferable right of entry and exit and
the impoundment safety provisions.
The deed of sale, the transferable right of entry and exit
("easement") on Access Road #5 and the deed's safety provi-
sions establish contractual relationships between TLC and
T2M. In order for a party to successfully assert the third-
party defense, CERCLA requires proof that the release of
hazardous substances and the resulting damages were
caused solely by a third party who has no contractual rela-
tionship with the defendant. 42 U.S.C § 9607(b)(3); State of
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1047 (2d Cir.
1985). A contractual relationship includes, but is not limited
to, land contracts, deeds, or other instruments transferring
title or possession of property. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A); see
United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 680 F.
Supp. 546, 557 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). Because TLC did not prove
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the absence of a contractual relationship, it cannot assert the
third-party defense.
The deed for Site 18 establishes an indirect contractual
relationship between TLC and T2M. In Hooker, where a cor-
poration deeded the contaminated Love Canal property to the
local Board of Education, and the Board subsequently deeded
the property to the City, the court held that the corporation
had a direct and an indirect contractual relationship with the
Board and the City respectively, and thus barred the use of
the third-party defense. Id. at 558. The Hooker court's con-
tractual relationship analysis is directly analogous to this
case. Here, TLC deeded the property to Mine-Finders and
Mine-Finders deeded it to T2M. Pursuant to the Hooker
court's holding, TLC has a direct contractual relationship
with Mine-Finders, and an indirect contractual relationship
with T2M, and may not escape liability under the third-party
defense.
Moreover, the deed of sale relates to the handling of haz-
ardous waste. In order to defeat the third-party defense,
some courts impose the further condition that the contractual
relationship be connected to the disposal related activity.
See, e.g., Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas
Distribution Corp., 964 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1992). The ease-
ment evidences a contractual relationship which relates to
the handling of the hazardous waste. Access Road #5 is con-
nected to the handling of the leachate because it provides the
only means for removal of the waste. TLC maintains the
road so that T2M can safely remove the leachate from the
site. Therefore, the easement renders the contractual rela-
tionship between TLC and T2M connected to the handling of
the leachate.
Additionally, the deed is connected to the handling of
hazardous waste because of its two safety provisions. One
provision guarantees the use of a NUDEP approved in-
dependent contractor to operate and maintain the surface im-
poundment, including removing the leachate waste from Site
18. (R.3). The second safety provision required annual envi-
ronmental audits. (R.3). These audits were conducted to
guarantee that the site was in compliance with all federal
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and state regulations relating to hazardous waste. There-
fore, both safety provisions demonstrate a contractual rela-
tionship that was related to the handling of the leachate.
TLC cannot escape liability by claiming that, because it
was unaware of the activities on Site 18, the contract does not
relate to the handling of hazardous waste. A lease relates to
the handling of hazardous substances when the lessor knows
that the lessee is involved in a business that uses hazardous
substances. See United States v. A & N Cleaners and Laun-
derers, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1317, 1320 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). InA &
N Cleaners, knowledge of hazardous substance use created a
contractual relationship that was related to the handling of
the substance. Id. at 1335.
Similarly, TLC's knowledge of the activities on Site 18
renders its contractual relationship connected to the han-
dling of the leachate. T2M mined the site for three and one
half years while TLC maintained the only entrance and exit.
Thus, TLC had knowledge that hazardous waste was being
generated on Site 18. TLC, one of the largest forest products
producers in the country, managed to discover ore on its land
as well as pinpoint the richest vein. (R.2). TLC then sold Site
18 to a company that specialized in matching mining compa-
nies with new sites. (R.2). Therefore, TLC should be held to
have the constructive knowledge advanced in A & N
Cleaners.
Furthermore, TLC cannot assert the innocent landowner
exception to the third party defense because it did not acquire
the contaminated property after the hazardous waste was re-
leased. The exception only applies when the property "...
was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or place-
ment of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility." 42
U.S.C. § 9601(35). The innocent landowner exception con-
templates situations where a party purchased land that was
already a hazardous waste site, indicating that this exception
applies only to subsequent owners. See, e.g., In re Heming-
way Transport, Inc. v. Kahn, 993 F.2d 915, 932 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 303 (1993); United States v. Serafini, 791
F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Pa. 1990). TLC may not avail itself of the
innocent landowner exception because it is not a subsequent
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owner. If Congress intended the innocent landowner excep-
tion to work in TLC's continuous ownership context, it would
not have used such explicit language in the statute.
Assuming, arguendo, that the "acquired by" element of
the exception were waived, TLC fails to meet the remaining
criteria of the innocent landowner exception. TLC must also
prove that it did not know and had no reason to know that
any hazardous substance was disposed of on its property, and
that it undertook all appropriate inquiry into the previous
ownership and uses of that property. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35)(A)(i),(B). TLC's specialized knowledge or experi-
ence, plus any commonly known or reasonably ascertainable
information about the property is relevant in determining ap-
propriate inquiry. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B); see In re Heming-
way Transport, 993 F.2d at 932. Further, this exception is
construed strictly and absentee landowners are liable even
when they did not participate in the action resulting in the
release of hazardous substances. See United States v. Mon-
santo Co., 858 F.2d at 168.
TLC cannot claim it had no knowledge of the mining ac-
tivity or the resulting hazardous waste. TLC maintained the
access road to the site and knew or should have known that
Site 18 was being used for mining and that hazardous waste
was being produced. In addition, it had special knowledge
and experience relating to mining. TLC not only discovered
the ore, but determined where the richest vein was located.
(R.2). Therefore, TLC knew that hazardous substances were
being produced on the site adjacent to the endangered spe-
cies' habitats and cannot assert the innocent landowner ex-
ception to avoid CERCLA liability.
2. TLC has failed to prove it exercised due care or
took precautions against T2M's foreseeable
acts or omissions.
TLC has failed to demonstrate that it exercised due care
and took precautions against T2M's foreseeable acts or omis-
sions which resulted in injury to the endangered species. In
order to avail itself of the third-party defense, a party must
exercise due care with respect to the hazardous waste and
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take precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of the
third party. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3); Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d at 1047.
TLC did not exercise due care or take precautions to pre-
vent injury to the endangered species, even though it had ac-
tual and constructive knowledge that these species lived
adjacent to Site 18. The ESA directs the Secretary of the In-
terior to publish a list of endangered species and a descrip-
tion of their critical habitats in the Code of Federal
Regulations ("CFR"). 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B). TLC had ac-
tual notice that endangered species were living on its land
because the daisy and robin are listed in the CFR. In addi-
tion, TLC had constructive knowledge that endangered spe-
cies lived on its land. Thousands of tourists made
quadrennial visits to New Union to observe the swallows en
route to the daisies in Harrison Forest. (R.1). Because the
swallows' flight is so well known, TLC had constructive
knowledge that the species lived on its land.
TLC also had constructive knowledge that the mining ac-
tivities on Site 18 might adversely effect the endangered spe-
cies on TLC's land. TLC knew that Site 18 was eventually
going to be used for mining ore, and that endangered species
were living adjacent to Site 18. Therefore, TLC should have
been aware that a toxic spill could threaten the species' exist-
ence. Injury to the endangered species was a foreseeable re-
sult of such a spill. Thus, TLC had a duty to take precautions
against T2M's acts or omissions and the foreseeable
consequences.
TLC could have taken a variety of precautions that
would have protected the endangered species on its land. For
instance, TLC could have placed an additional provision in
the deed alerting any subsequent owner of Site 18 that two
endangered species inhabited the land adjacent to the site.
TLC could have contacted T2M directly to inform them about
the daisy and robin. Perhaps T2M would then have removed
the endangered species from the zone of danger, by building a
wall to prevent runoff from Site 18. Furthermore, TLC could
have alerted the DOI or the Environmental Protection
Agency about the mining and its proximity to the species.
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This could have led to (a) a relocation of the species before the
toxic spill; (b) the Secretary placing more stringent require-
ments on T2M; or (c) the government purchasing the land
pursuant to the ESA's land acquisition provision. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1534. However, because TLC failed to take any precau-
tions, it did not exercise due care, and thus, cannot assert the
third-party defense.
C. TLC cannot avail itself of the combination defense
because it has not satisfied any of the affirmative
defenses.
The combination defense is not available to TLC because
it has not satisfied any of the affirmative defenses. The dis-
trict court incorrectly applied the combination defense and
thus, its decision must be reversed. The combination defense
is available to a defendant who can show that the release was
caused "solely by ... any combination" of an act of God, act of
war or an act or omission of a third party. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b)(4). When determining how to apply a statutory
provision, courts must look first to the plain meaning of the
statute. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
When a statute is ambiguous, however, evidence other than
the plain meaning may be used to determine congressional
intent. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S.
41, 48 (1928). Regardless of the evidence relied on by the
court, the statute must be sensibly construed to avoid absurd
results. Rector, Etc., of Holy Trinity Church v. United States,
143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892). The combination defense is ambig-
uous because it has numerous meanings. Therefore, the
court must look to the legislative history behind CERCLA
and relevant case law in order to understand the combination
defense.
The combination defense provided by CERCLA is inher-
ently ambiguous. Because the statute requires defendants to
establish a combination of the foregoing paragraphs, it can
mean that they must meet all of the elements of more than
one defense. It may also mean that factors other than those
included in the three defenses must not have added to the
release. In addition, the combination defense could mean
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that parties may plead in the alternative, so that a defendant
is not restricted to asserting one defense. Or it might mean
that the defendant must meet 99% of one defense and 99% of
another, or perhaps only 10% of one and 70% of another, or
any other percentage of more than one defense. Chief Justice
Marshall observed that "where the mind labors to discover
the design of the legislature, it seizes everything from which
aid can be derived. . ... " United States v. Fischer, 6 U.S. 358,
356 (1805). Accordingly, because the provision is unclear,
congressional intent and case law demonstrate the proper in-
terpretation of the combination defense.
The congressional debate behind the enactment of CER-
CLA helps to clarify the combination defense. In interpreting
statutes, a court may consider a clearly expressed legislative
intent or policy that is contrary to the language of the statute.
Escobar Ruiz v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 838
F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 1988). One of Congress's primary
goals in passing CERCLA was holding parties who are in
some way responsible for toxic spills liable, rather than the
taxpayers. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy,
Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986). Congress recog-
nized that if polluters were allowed to escape liability in such
an easy fashion, they would have little incentive to prevent
pollution and toxic spills. H.R. REP. NO. 253(I), 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985). Therefore, Congress made CERCLA's liabil-
ity strict, and explicitly limited the defenses to those found in
§ 9607(b). Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 160.
Finally, case law does not support a finding that
§ 9607(b)(4) can be met by proving only partial defenses to
CERCLA. There are a number of cases where defendants
have raised the combination defense, but none have allowed
the defendant to avoid CERCLA liability by proving only a
part of several defenses. See, e.g., Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp.
at 1061; United States v. Pretty Products, Inc., 780 F. Supp.
1488 (S.D. Ohio. 1991). An application of the combination de-
fense begins with a determination of whether any of the other
defenses have been met. See Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. at
1061. Once it is determined that no single defense has been
fully satisfied, courts have not gone on to decide whether the
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addition of two partial defenses create a successful combina-
tion defense. Because TLC cannot establish that the release
was caused by either an act of God or by a third party, it
should not be allowed to establish a combination defense.
TLC should not be allowed to establish a combination de-
fense because such a ruling would lead to absurd results. In
Rector, the Court held that a literal reading of the immigra-
tion law which barred English clergyman from working in the
United States was not the intended meaning of the law. Rec-
tor, 143 U.S. at 460. The Court found that upholding such a
prohibition would lead to absurd results. Id. Similarly, it is
absurd to allow TLC to avoid liability when it cannot estab-
lish either the act of God defense or the third party defense.
It is illogical that Congress would require a CERCLA defend-
ant to prove explicit and rigorous statutory defenses, but al-
low them to escape liability under a combination defense that
allows diluted partial defenses. Therefore, the district court's
holding produces absurd results and undermines the pur-
poses of CERCLA because it.permits responsible parties to
avoid liability.
Furthermore, if combination defenses made up of partial
statutory defenses were adopted by other courts, it would re-
sult in inconsistent CERCLA decisions. An interpretation al-
lowing courts to design their own combination defense to a
strict liability statute is not what Congress intended. If
courts created their own combination defense, one court could
decide that twenty-percent of one defense and thirty-percent
of another is adequate, while another court decides that
ninety-percent of both are required. If the combination de-
fense was intended to incorporate "parts" of two defenses,
Congress would have included language guiding courts on
what percent of defenses are needed to add up to a whole de-
fense. Therefore, because TLC has failed to establish the req-
uisite elements of any of the affirmative defenses, it may not
now use a combination of partial defenses to escape liability.
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D. Equitable defenses are not enumerated under
CERCLA and therefore unavailable to TLC.
The only defenses permitted under CERCLA are those
enumerated within the statute. A majority of courts have re-
jected equitable defenses as inconsistent with the congres-
sional intent and explicit language of the statute. See United
States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 424 (D.N.J. 1991). These
courts acknowledge that equitable jurisdiction may be limited
by a clear and valid legislative command. Weinberger v. Ro-
mero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982). The plain language
of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) provides the clear legislative command
by limiting the defenses to those set forth in subsection (b).
See Smith Land and Improv. Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d
86 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989). Accord-
ingly, only the affirmative defenses of an act of God, act of
war, or act of a third party may be asserted in a CERCLA
action. See United States v. Amtreco, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 959,
968 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
This court should follow the substantial weight of au-
thority denying the use of equitable defenses for the following
reasons. First, the state is immune from equitable doctrines
when it asserts public rights. Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co.,
714 F. Supp. 1439, 1451 (W.D. Mich. 1989). "Equitable prin-
ciples will not be applied to thwart public policy or the pur-
pose of federal laws." Id. Second, allowing equitable
defenses would undermine the broad, remedial purpose of
CERCLA. Last, claims under § 9607(a)(4)(C) have been held
to be legal in nature, rather than equitable, rendering equita-
ble defenses inapplicable. In re Acushnet River & New Bed-
ford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. at 999.
TLC should not be allowed to raise equitable defenses be-
cause they are not contemplated by CERCLA. Serving as
trustee, New Union is asserting its police power to protect its
natural resources and the public health, thus immunizing the
state from equitable doctrines. In addition, allowing equita-
ble defenses would undermine the purposes of CERCLA by
relieving potentially responsible parties of liability. This
would have catastrophic impact on health and the human en-
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vironment because many companies would not clean-up their
hazardous waste spills. Moreover, it would remove the deter-
rent effect of clean-up costs, which encourage potential pol-
luters to properly treat, store and dispose of hazardous waste.
Finally, New Union is asserting legal claims, seeking dam-
ages to study alternate habitats for the robin and to re-propa-
gate the daisy. As in Acushnet, New Union is seeking the
legal remedy of natural resource damages, and equitable de-
fenses do not apply. Therefore, TLC may not substitute equi-
table defenses for CERCLA's enumerated defenses in order to
escape liability.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellee State of New Union
respectfully requests this Court to uphold the District Court's
decision allowing the State of New Union to assert natural
resource trusteeship and to reverse the District Court's deci-




State of New Union
1994] 825
39
826 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11
APPENDIX B
U.S. CONSTITUTION, 5TH AMENDMENT
[Nior shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.
16 U.S.C. § 1532
Definitions
(5)(A) The term "critical habitat" for a threatened or en-
dangered species means-
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occu-
pied by the species, at the time it is listed in accordance with
the provisions of section 1533 of this title, on which are found
those physical or biological features (I) essential to the con-
servation of the species and (II) which may require special
management considerations or protection; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied
by the species at the time it is listed in accordance with the
provisions of section 1533 of this title, upon a determination
by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the conser-
vation of the species.
(19) The term "take" means to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to at-
tempt to engage in any such conduct.
16 U.S.C. § 1533
(b) Basis for determinations
(3)(B) Within 12 months after receiving a petition that is
found under subparagraph (A) to present substantial infor-
mation indicating that the petitioned action may be war-
ranted, the Secretary shall make one of the following
findings:
(i) The petitioned action is not warranted, in which case
the Secretary shall promptly publish such finding in the Fed-
eral Register.
(ii) The petitioned action is warranted, in which case the
Secretary shall promptly publish in the Federal Register a
general notice and the complete text of a proposed regulation
to implement such action in accordance with paragraph (5).
(iii) The petitioned action is warranted, but that-
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(I) the immediate proposal and timely promulgation of a
final regulation implementing the petitioned action in accord-
ance with paragraphs (5) and (6) is precluded by pending pro-
posals to determine whether any species is an endangered
species or a threatened species, and
(II) expeditious progress is being made to add qualified
species to either of the lists published under subsection (c) of
this section and to remove from such lists species for which
the protections of this chapter are no longer necessary,
- in which case the Secretary shall promptly publish
such finding in the Federal Register, together with a descrip-
tion and evaluation of the reasons and data on which the
finding is based.
16 U.S.C. § 1534
Land acquisition
(a) Implementation of conservation program; authoriza-
tion of Secretary and Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary, and the Secretary of Agriculture with re-
spect to the National Forest System, shall establish and im-
plement a program to conserve fish, wildlife, and plants,
including those which are listed as endangered species or
threatened species pursuant to section 1533 of this title. To
carry out such a program, the appropriate Secretary-
(1) shall utilize the land acquisition and other authority
under the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, as amended [16
U.S.C.A. s 742a et seq.], the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act, as amended [16 U.S.C.A. s 661 et seq.], and the Migra-
tory Bird Conservation Act [16 U.S.C.A. s 715 et seq.], as ap-
propriate; and
(2) is authorized to acquire by purchase, donation, or
otherwise, lands, waters, or interest therein, and such au-
thority shall be in addition to any other land acquisition au-
thority vested in him.
(b) Availability of funds for acquisition of lands, waters,
etc.
Funds made available pursuant to the Land and Water
Conservation Fund Act of 1965, as amended [16 U.S.C.A. s
4601-4 et seq.], may be used for the purpose of acquiring
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lands, waters, or interests therein under subsection (a) of this
section.
16 U.S.C. § 1535
Cooperation with States
(a) Generally
In carrying out the program authorized by this chapter,
the Secretary shall cooperate to the maximum extent practi-
cable with the States. Such cooperation shall include consul-
tation with the States concerned before acquiring any land or
water, or interest therein, for the purpose of conserving any
endangered species or threatened species.
(f) Conflicts between Federal and State laws
... Any State law or regulation respecting the taking of
an endangered species or threatened species may be more re-
strictive than the exemptions or permits provided for in this
chapter or in any regulation which implements this chapter
but not less restrictive than the prohibitions so defined.
16 U.S.C. § 1538
Prohibited acts
(a) Generally
(1) Except as provided in sections 1535(g)(2) and 1539 of
this title, with respect to any endangered species of fish or
wildlife listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title it is un-
lawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States to-
(A) import any such species into, or export any such spe-
cies from the United States;
(B) take any such species within the United States or the
territorial sea of the United States;
(C) take any such species upon the high seas;
(D) possess, sell, deliver, carry, transport, or ship, by any
means whatsoever, any such species taken in violation of sub-
paragraphs (B) and (C);
(E) deliver, receive, carry, transport, or ship in interstate
or foreign commerce, by any means whatsoever and in the
course of a commercial activity, any such species;
(F) sell or offer for sale in interstate or foreign commerce
any such species; or
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(G) violate any regulation pertaining to such species or
to any threatened species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to
section 1533 of this title and promulgated by the Secretary
pursuant to authority provided by this chapter.
(2) Except as provided in sections 1535(g)(2) and 1539 of
this title, with respect to any endangered species of plants
listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title, it is unlawful for
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
to-
(A) import any such species into, or export any such spe-
cies from, the United States;
(B) remove and reduce to possession any such species
from areas under Federal jurisdiction; maliciously damage or
destroy any such species on any such area; or remove, cut,
dig up, or damage or destroy any such species on any other
area in knowing violation of any law or regulation of any
State or in the course of any violation of a State criminal tres-
pass law....
16 U.S.C. § 1540
(e) Enforcement
(4)(A) All fish or wildlife or plants taken, possessed, sold,
purchased, offered for sale or purchase, transported, deliv-
ered, received, carried, shipped, exported, or imported con-
trary to the provisions of this chapter, any regulation made
pursuant thereto, or any permit or certificate issued hereun-
der shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States.
42 U.S.C. § 9601
Definitions
For purpose of this subchapter-
(1) The term "act of God" means an unanticipated grave
natural disaster or other natural phenomenon of an excep-
tional, inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of
which could not have been prevented or avoided by the exer-
cise of due care or foresight.
(16) The term "natural resources" means land, fish, wild-
life, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies,
and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in
trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the
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United States (including the resources of the fishery conser-
vation zone established by the Magnuson Fishery Conserva-
tion and Management Act [16 U.S.C.A. s 1801 et seq.] ) any
State or local government, any foreign government, any In-
dian tribe, or, if such resources are subject to a trust restric-
tion on alienation, any member of an Indian tribe.
(35)(A) The term "contractual relationship", for the pur-
pose of section 9607(b)(3) of this title includes, but is not lim-
ited to, land contracts, deeds or other instruments
transferring title or possession, unless the real property on
which the facility concerned is located was acquired by the
defendant after the disposal or placement of the hazardous
substance on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of the
circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also estab-
lished by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the de-
fendant did not know and had no reason to know that any
hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or
threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired
the facility by escheat, or through any other involuntary
transfer or acquisition, or through the exercise of eminent do-
main authority by purchase or condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or
bequest.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must
establish that he has satisfied the requirements of section
9607(b)(3)(a) and (b) of this title.
(B) To establish that the defendant had no reason to
know, as provided in clause (i) of subparagraph (A) of this
paragraph, the defendant must have undertaken, at the time
of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous own-
ership and uses of the property consistent with good commer-
cial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability.
For purposes of the preceding sentence the court shall take
into account any specialized knowledge or experience on the
part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase price
to the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly
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known or reasonably ascertainable information about the
property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of
contamination at the property, and the ability to detect such
contamination by appropriate inspection.
42 U.S.C. § 9607
Liability
(a) Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and dam-
ages; interest rate; "comparable maturity" date
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and
subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this
section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazard-
ous substance owned or operated any facility at which such
hazardous substances were disposed.
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a trans-
porter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such haz-
ardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities,
incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from
which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes
the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance,
shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by
the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe
not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by
any other person consistent with the national contingency
plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natu-
ral resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing
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(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects
study carried out under section 9604(i) of this title. The
amounts recoverable in an action under this section shall in-
clude interest on the amounts recoverable under subpara-
graphs (A) through (D). Such interest shall accrue from the
later of (i) the date payment of a specified amount is de-
manded in writing, or (ii) the date of the expenditure con-
cerned. The rate of interest on the outstanding unpaid
balance of the amounts recoverable under this section shall
be the same rate as is specified for interest on investments of
the Hazardous Substance Superfund established under sub-
chapter A of chapter 98 of Title 26. For purposes of applying
such amendments to interest under this subsection, the term
"comparable maturity" shall be determined with reference to
the date on which interest accruing under this subsection
commences.
(b) Defenses
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this
section for a person otherwise liable who can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of
release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting
therefrom were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an em-
ployee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or
omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship,
existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except
where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a pub-
lished tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier
by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of
the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the
hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration the
characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all rel-
evant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions
against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party
and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such
acts or omissions; or
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(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
(f) Actions involving natural resources; maintenance,
scope, etc.
(1) Natural resources liability
In the case of an injury to, destruction of, or loss of natu-
ral resources under subparagraph (C) of subsection (a) of this
section liability shall be to the United States Government
and to any State for natural resources within the State or be-
longing to, managed by, controlled by, or appertaining to such
State and to any Indian tribe for natural resources belonging
to, managed by, controlled by, or appertaining to such tribe,
or held in trust for the benefit of such tribe, or belonging to a
member of such tribe if such resources are subject to a trust
restriction on alienation....
50 C.F.R. § 17.3
Definitions.
"Harass" in the definition of "take" in the Act means an
intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the
likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an ex-
tent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns
which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding or
sheltering.
"Harm" in the definition of "take" in the Act means an act
which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include
significant habitat modification or degradation where it actu-
ally kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essen-
tial behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or
sheltering.
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